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PREFACE 
Water  r e s o u r c e  s y s t e m s  have  been an i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  and  env i ronmen t  r e l a t e d  r e s e a r c h  a t  IIASA s i n c e  i t s  
i n c e p t i o n .  A s  demands f o r  w a t e r  i n c r e a s e  r e l a t i v e  t o  s u p p l y ,  
t h e  i n t e n s i t y  and  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  management mus t  
be d e v e l o p e d  f u r t h e r .  T h i s  i n  t u r n  r e q u i r e s  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
d e g r e e  o f  d e t a i l  and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
economic,  s o c i a l  and  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  
deve lopmen t  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a i d e d  by a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
m o d e l l i n g  t e c h n i q u e s ,  t o  g e n e r a t e  i n p u t s  f o r  p l a n n i n g ,  d e s i g n ,  
and  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s .  
Dur ing  t h e  y e a r  o f  1978 it  was d e c i d e d  t h a t  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  
c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  demand s t u d i e s ,  a n  a t t e m p t  would be made t o  i n -  
t e g r a t e  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  o u r  s t u d i e s  on w a t e r  demands w i t h  w a t e r  
s u p p l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  T h i s  new t a s k  was named " R e g i o n a l  Water  
Management (Task  1 ,  R e s o u r c e s  a n d  Envi ronment  ~ r e a ) " .  
T h i s  p a p e r  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  
w a t e r  s u p p l y / w a t e r  demand s y s t e m s  which  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  s y s t e m  
a b i l i t y  to p e r f o r m  unde r  d i f f e r e n t  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  t h a n  o r i g i n a l l y  
e x p e c t e d  a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  i n c r e m e n t a l  c o s t s .  I t  i s  shown 
how t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  may be  u s e d  ( i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  
c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  c r i t e r i o n )  f o r  s c r e e n i n g  l o n g  l e a d - t i m e  
i n v e s t m e n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
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1 .  PROBLEM D E F I N I T I O N  
Suppose we have s u c c e s s f u l l y  developed a water  demand 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
where X i s  a v e c t o r  of explana tory  v a r i a b l e s  and 5 i s  a random 
v a r i a b l e .  A major problem, that remains i s  what ~ c t i o n  is  t o  be 
taken now t o  cope w i t h  f u t u r e  demand which can be f o r e c a s t e d  by 
(1) . It  i s  u s u a l l y  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  random fac-  
t o r  5 v a r i a b i l i t i e s  are a l s o  involved i n  X - i t s e l f  due t o  t h e  
f u t u r e  p o l i c y  changes,  economic and t echno log ic  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  
s o c i a l  changes,  etc.  
L e t  Z r e p r e s e n t  a v a r i a n t  o f  f u t u r e  events .  That  is ,  Z 
may be a va lue  ( o r  a range o f  va lues )  o f  an impor tan t  parameter ,  
o r  it may r e p r e s e n t  an a l t e r n a t i v e  development s c e n a r i o ,  e i t h e r  
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  s p e c i f i e d .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  case, 
Z ,  may c o n s i s t  o f  v a l u e s  o f  a  few ( o r  more) f a c t o r s  which cha rac -  
t e r i z e  f u t u r e  outcomes.  
I t  i s  assumed t h a t  e f f e c t s  o f  randomness,  r e p r e s e n t e d  by 5, 
on Y a r e  minor a s  compared w i t h  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  Z .  
The e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  5 a r e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  e v e n t Z  
and t h u s  u n c e r t a i n t y  is  i n v o l v e d  i n  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  f u t u r e  water 
demand Y. 
The f o l l o w i n g  n o t a t i o n s  are i n t r o d u c e d :  
L e t  a 1 , a 2 ,  ..., a be  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e .  r 
Each ai may b e  e i t h e r  s t r u c t u r a l  o r  n o n - s t r u c t u r a l  measures  o r  
combina t ion  t h e r e o f ;  e .g .  it may r e p r e s e n t  deve lop ing  a new 
major  w a t e r  s o u r c e - l i k e  i n t e r - b a s i n  t r a n s f e r ,  o r  imposing 
s t r i n g e n t  was t ewa te r  e f f l u e n t  s t a n d a r d s  t o  encourage  r e c y c l i n g  
s o  t h a t  w a t e r  demand w i l l  be supp. ressed.  
L e t  Z 1 , Z 2 ,  . . . , Z k  d e n o t e  v a r i a n t s  o f  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  a s  
d e s c r i b e d  above. 
Def ine  the f o l l o w i n g  c o s t s :  
Ki = i n i t i a l  c o s t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a l t e r n a t i v e  a i l  
'i j = a d d i t i o n a l  costs which w i l l  b e  i n c u r r e d  by t a k i n g  
a c t i o n  ai, w h i l e  a c t u a l  outcome i s  Z j 
SCi j  = Ki + C i j  = t o t a l  costs for  (ai, Z j )  ( 2 )  
LCj = min[Ki 
+ ' i j  I = c o s t s  of  t h e  most e f f i c i e n t  i a l t e r n a t i v e  under  t h e  e v e n t  
Assume b o th  Ki a m  C are p o s i t i v e  (and t h u s  s o  i s  L C . ) .  i j  1 
N o t e  t h a t  the i n i t i a l  costs Ki can  be  d e f i n e d  w i t h o u t  r e f e r r i n g  
t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  f u t u r e  c o n d i t i o n s  Z Depending on  t h e  a c t u a l  1. 
outcome Z some a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  C are i n c u r r e d .  The add i -  j i j 
t i o n a l  c o s t s  C may i n c l u d e  costs o f  modifying t h e  o r i g i n a l  i j  
a c t i o n  a  and s h o r t - r u n  l o s s e s  due t o  changes  i n  economic a c t i v -  i 
i t i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  c o s t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  o p e r a t i n g  t h e  sys tem under  
t h e  e v e n t  Z 1. Once the t o t a l  c o s t s  S i j  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  ai 
and t h e  minimum c o s t s  LC under  e v e n t  Z a r e  computed, t h e  j j Q 
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  OCij a r e  d e f i n e d  as 
The o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  a r e  t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  c o s t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a i  of  n o t  p l a n n i n g  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e l y  f o r  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  e v e n t  Z I 
2. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
A c o n v e n t i o n a l  approach t o  t h e  problem o f  s e l e c t i n g  a n  
a p p r o p r i a t e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  i s  t o  s p e c i f y  a  s i n g l e  v a r i a n t  o f  
f u t u r e  e v e n t s  Z = Z (as t h e  p l a n n i n g  c o n d i t i o n s )  and t o  t a k e  j 
a c t i o n  ai s o  t h a t  
Ki + C i j  + min 
ai 
If t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  P o f  Z i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  t h i s  s i n g l e  Z may be  
. j  j 
such a  v a r i a n t  t h a t  h a s  t h e  maximum v a l u e  o f  P  o r  t h a t  i s  j 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by ave rage  v a l u e s  o f  f a c t o r s  d e s c r i b i n g  f u t u r e  
-. 
outcomes ( s y m b o l i c a l l y  Z = Z S .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  way i s  t o  u s e  expec t ed  v a l u e s  and t o  t a k e  
a c t i o n  a i  s o  t h a t  t h e  expec t ed  t o t a l  costs a r e  minimized o v e r  
a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  a c t i o n s :  
Ki  + cCi  jPj + min 
3 a i 
T h i s  approach  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  min imiz ing  t h e  e x p e c t e d  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t s  o v e r  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  a c t i o n s  as m a n i f e s t e d  below. T h a t  
i s ,  
= LOCij. P  + ZLC ' P  , 
j j j  j j 
where t h e  second summation does  n o t  depend on t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
S t i l l  a n o t h e r  approach i s  p r o v i d a d  by what  i s  called t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e d i c t i o n s  method (APM). An economic approach  o f  
APM d e s c r i b e d  by Pawlowski ( 1978 )  is  as f o l l o w s .  F i r s t  v a r i o u s  
s u b s e t s  A o f  {z i , . . . ,Zk} i s  s p e c i f i e d .  The minimum c o s t s  LCA 
are d e f i n e d  on e a c h  s u b s e t  A r a t h e r  t h a n  on e a c h  e v e n t  Z j 
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  OC are d e f i n e d  f o r  a l l  Z .  $ 
A j 3 
A. Then, among a l l  t h e  " a d m i s s i b l e "  s u b s e t s  o f  {Zi, . . . ,Zk}, 
c o n s t r u c t  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e d i c t i o n  A s o  t h a t  
L C A +  Z OCRj P  + Z Z OCik P  + min . 
Z .?!A Zk"A ZicA k A  
3 
Here an a d m i s s i b l e  p r e d i c t i o n  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  one  h a v i n g  p r o b a b i l -  I 
i t y  o f  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  becoming t r u e  b e i n g  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  
t o  a p r e d e t e r m i n e d  number y (0 < y < 1 ) . F i n a l l y  an  a c t i o n  w i l l  I 
b e  de te rmined  b a s e d  o n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t e d  p r e d i c t i d n  A. 
The most g e n e r a l  way t o  d e a l  w i t h  the problem o f  d e c i s i o n -  
making under  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  which 
w i l l  o r d e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  outcomes a c c o r d i n g  t o  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s  
p r e f e r e n c e  o f  " r i s k y "  c h o i c e .  I n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c a s e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
K i l C i j  and P . This approach,  however, w i l l  n o t  be t r e a t e d  j  
here  except  f o r  a  few s p e c i a l  c a s e s .  
3. CRITIQUES ON THE CONVENTIONAL 
METHODS AND THE APM 
When cho ice  of  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  is  t o  be made under u n c e r t a i n t y  
involved i n  f u t u r e  outcomes, i t  is  impor tan t  t o  e v a l u a t e  each 
a l t e r n a t i v e  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  i t s  performance under vary ing  condi- 
t i o n s  r a t h e r  than  s e l e c t i n g  t h e  one which i s  opt imal  ( c o s t -  
e f f e c t i v e )  under "des ign"  c o n d i t i o n s .  This  k ind  o f  cons idera-  
t i o n  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  wa te r  supply/demand 
systems, s i n c e  water  supply  systems t y p i c a l l y  involve  l a r g e - s c a l e  
f a c i l i t i e s  w i t h  a  long  lead- t ime f o r  des ign  and c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
and any a c t i o n  o f  demand/supply i n t e g r a t i o n  has  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
l o n g - l a s t i n g  e f f e c t s .  I t  i s  a l s o  a  well-documented f a c t  t h a t  
e x c l u s i v e  use o f  expected va lues  t o  e v a l u a t e  and s c r e e n  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e s  which a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  v a r i a b i l i t i e s  o f  va r ious  k inds  can 
be q u i t e  mis lead ing  ( s e e  f o r  example, Adans and Gemell, 1975; 
Szidarovsky e t  a l .  1976) .  Thus t h e  convent iona l  approaches are 
no t  very s a t i s f a c t o r y .  Th i s  p o i n t  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  example 
g iven  l a t e r .  
- U s e  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e d i c t i o n s  method i s  a  b e t t e r  approach 
t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n  and s e l e c t i o n  i n  t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  on 
i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s  a r e  made based on a broader  range o f  in format ion  
conta ined  i n  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e d i c t i o n s  A r a t h e r  than  on a  s i n g l e  
event  Z .  A few problems involved i n  APM, however, are noted.  
To d e f i n e  t h e  c o s t s  LCA, one-to-one correspondence i s  necessa rybe -  
tween an a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e d i c t i o n s  A ( a  s u b s e t  o f  f u t u r e  even t s  
2 ,  . Z )  and t h e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  based on it. That i s ,  some 
sc reen ing  procedure  i s  a l r eady  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
L C A  Also t h e  APM does  n o t  t e l l  how t o  d e f i n e  an i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  
based on A. Thi s  two-step procedure  may obscu re  in format ion-  on 
a l t e r n a t i v e  o p t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  s c r e e n i n g  p roces ses .  
Some more g e n e r a l  p o i n t s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  problem o f  s c reen ing  
I 
a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i o n s  w i l l  be no ted  t o  mo t iva t e  s e a r c h  f o r  o t h e r  
p o s s i b l e  methodologies.  
I n  many cases o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n  and s c r e e n i n g ,  some 
( i f  n o t  a l l )  o f  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s  are composi tes  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  and 
n o n - s t r u c t u r a l  measures;  e .g .  deve lop ing  new water s o u r c e s  w i th  
a p p r o p r i a t e  p r i c i n g  p o l i c i e s  o r  w i t h  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  arrangements.  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  P a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  each  f u t u r e  outcome Z may j j 
very  w e l l  be a f u n c t i o n  of  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  w a t e r  and p r i c i n g  schemes w i l l  a f f e c t  municipal  
growth, which, i n  t u r n ,  i s  one o f  de te rmin ing  f a c t o r s  o f  f u t u r e  
w a t e r  demand. Also t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  P most l i k e l y  i s  e v a l u a t e d  j 
more o r  less s u b j e c t i v e l y ,  as it w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  n o t  o n l y  what 
i s  l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r  b u t  a l s o  which development p a t h  d e c i s i o n -  
makers p r e f e r  more t o  o t h e r s .  There i s  no such t h i n g  as e x p e r t ' s  
o b j e c t i v e  assessment .  
S ince ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  bo th  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  P and c o s t s  vary j 
among a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  some composite measures a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
a l l o w  comparisons among a l t e r n a t i v e s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  
and n o n - s t r u c t u r a l  measures. For a measure t o  be o p e r a t i o n a l ,  
it should  a l s o  be d e f i n e d  i n  such a way t h a t  r e f l e c t s  behav iou ra l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  decision-makers and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  such a measure should  s t a n d  f o r  s u b j e c t i v e  
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  f u t u r e  
outcomes and d i f f e r e n t  r i s k  behav iou r s .  1 )  
4 .  ROBUSTNESS CRITERION 
4.1 .  Concepts  o f  Robustness  
A concep t  o f  r o b u s t n e s s  h a s  been adop t ed  i n  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  
p l ann ing  by F i e r i n g  from s t a t i s t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  ( F i e r i n g ,  1976; 
Mata las  and  F i e r i n g ,  1976) .  I n  s t a t i s t i c s ,  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  o f  a  
d e c i s i o n  t o  a c c e p t  o r  re ject  a  p a r t i c u l a r  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  h i g h ,  i f  
t h a t  d e c i s i o n  would remain unchanged o v e r  a wide  r ange  o f  sample 
v a l u e s  o r  ev idence  on which t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  t o  be  based .  A s  
no t ed  by F i e r i n g  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  however, a  r o b u s t n e s s  measure shou ld  
n o t  s imply  be a  p h y s i c a l  q u a n t i t y ;  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  
i .e .  c o s t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  such  a  d e c i s i o n  s h o u l d  be  i n c o r p o r a t e d  
i n  it. I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  concep t  o f  r o b u s t n e s s  i s  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  S t i g l e r ' s  concep t  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  ( S t i g l e r ,  1939 ) ,  a s  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  Appendix. 
According t o  t h e  above r e a s o n i n g ,  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  
i s  d e f i n e d  f o r  a  w a t e r  supply/demand sys tem a s  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  
cope w i t h  v a r y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  Z a t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  j 
c o s t s .  Depending on i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  a i  and subsequen t  modi f i ca -  
t i o n s  and o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  sys tem,  t h e  c o s t s  SCij = Ki + C i j  
w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  among a l t e r n a t i v e s  a i  and t h u s  p r o v i d e  b a s i s  
f o r  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  r o b u s t n e s s  measures .  The r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  
w i l l  supplement  a  c o n v e n t i o n a l  o p t i m a l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o s t -  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  o f  s c r e e n i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a i .  
) I n  c a s e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e d i c t i o n s  method, r i s k  behav iou r s  
may be  r e f l e c t e d  i n  c h o i c e  o f  y ,  t h e  a d m i s s i b l e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
l e v e l  o f  a  p r e d i c t i o n  coming t r u e .  
4 . 2 .  Proposed Measures of  Robustness 
Measures a r e  sought  f o r  r ep resen t ing  v a r i a b i l i t i e s  o r  devia- 
t i o n  of economic performance a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  each a l t e r n a t i v e  ai. 
Comparing c o s t s  C i j  under d i f f e r e n t  even t s  {z.) w i t h i n  each a l t e r -  3 
n a t i v e  ai ,  however, i s  no t  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  s i n c e  r e fe rence  p o i n t s  
a r e  d i f f e r e n t  among a l t e r n a t i v e s .  F i r s t  d e f i n e  an oppor tun i ty  
c o s t  r a t i o  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  ai  under even t  Z j 
O C i j  - S C ~ .  - L C .  ROCij = - LC LC j j 
U s e  of  " t h e  minimum" c o s t s  LC e l i m i n a t e s  t h e  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  j 
discussed  above. 
Next, based on t h e  correspondence between t h e  even t  Z and j 
t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  r a t i o  ROCij ,  and on t h e  p r e s p e c i f i e d  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  - P = { p j )  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  d i f f e r e n t  even t s  Z der ived  
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  Gi ( 2 )  of t h e  o p ~ o r t u n i t y  c o a t  r a t i o  
ROCi f o r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  ai: 
G. ( e )  = pr{ROCi < L )  
1 
I t  i s  noted t h a t  i n  t h e  range where t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  
r a t i o  i s  smal l ,  i t s  e x a c t  va lue  w i l l  n o t  be much o f  a  concern; 
t h e  v a r i a b i l i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h a t  range may be i n  t h e  same o r d e r  a s  
those  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  random f a c t o r  5 i n  ( 1 ) .  Also no te  t h a t  
it is  impossible  t o  p lan  any system s o  t h a t  t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  
i s  bounded f o r  any extreme event .  These obse rva t ions  sugges t  a  
method of comparing a l t e r n a t i v e s  by some p e r c e n t i l e  of t h e  
oppor tuni ty  c o s t  r a t i o .  
Based on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  G i ( e )  of  t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  
r a t i o ,  t h e  fo l lowing two measures of  robus tness  a r e  def ined  
f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  ai: 
where fi and 6 are p r e s p e c i f i e d  va lues  (0 < 8 ,  0 < 6 < f and 
- 1 
Gi ( -  ) i s  t h e  i n v e r s e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  Gi.  
.. The va lue  of  B r e p r e s e n t s  a maximum t o l e r a b l e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  op- 
p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  r a t i o ,  ROCi and 6 is  such a  l e v e l  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  
- 1 
t h a t  ROCi is  less t han  o r  equa l  t o  Gi ( 6 )  . Correspondence o f  
t h e s e  d e f i n i t i o n s  is  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu re  1 f o r  a cont inuous  
case .  These d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  by say ing  t h a t  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  a i  has  t h e  va lue  o f  robus tnes s  a t  t h e  l e v e l  8 o r  6 
i 
equa l  t o  Rs o r  Ri ( 6 ) . The measure R may be e a s i e r  t o  e v a l u a t e  B 
based on t h e  under ly ing  p r o b a b i l i t y  P of  v a r i a n t  Z b u t  when j j 
t h e  f u t u r e  s t a t e  space  i s  very  d i s c r e t e  ( i . e .  o n l y  a  few v a r i a n t s  
a r e  d e f i n e d ) ,  it may n o t  h e l p  very  much t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e s .  
5 .  USES OF ROBUSTNESS 
Having robus tnes s  a s  a n o t h e r  c r i t e r i o n ,  a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches 
o f  performance e v a l u a t i o n  and s c r e e n i n g  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  con- 
c e i v a b l e .  F i r s t  it is p o s s i b l e  t o  maximize Ri ( 6 )  o r  Ri over  
6 
a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s  ai .  This  i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  
t o  what i s  known a s  minimax c r i t e r i o n  i n  game theo ry .  In  f a c t ,  
from t h e  s p e c i f i e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  g = { P . )  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  v a r i a n t s  
7 
{ Z  . )  of  f u t u r e  outcomes, and from computed va lues  of  t h e  
7 
Figure 1. Correspondence between Two Xeasures 
o f  Robustness RB and R ( 6 )  
oppor tun i ty  c o s t s  r a t i o  ROC f o r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a i  under t h e  i j  
even t  Z w e  can f i n d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  100 4 p e r c e n t i l e  o f  ROCi. 
I '
I n s t e a d  of  minimizing t h e  maximum r e g r e t ,  t h e  robus tness  maxi- 
miza t ion  al lows minimizing a  c e r t a i n  p e r c e n t i l e  of oppor tun i ty  
c o s t  ( o r  r e g r e t )  r a t i o .  
A more gene ra l  approach, which i s  advocated h e r e ,  i s  t o  
c o n s i d e r  t rad ing-of f  between t h e  convent iona l  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
c r i t e r i o n  ( i n  t h e  sense  of minimizing expected t o t a l  c o s t s )  and 
t h e  robus tness  c r i t e r i o n .  This  i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  one o f  
s t anda rd  r i s k - t h e o r e t i c  approaches;  viz. mean-variance t r ade -o f f s .  
U s e  o f  va r i ance  o f  c o s t s  ( o r  b e n e f i t s )  involved i n  any d e c i s i o n  
v i s - a -v i s  expec t ed  va lue  o f  c o s t s  ( o r  b e n e f i t s )  i s  one way t o  
r e f l e c t  " r i s k i n e s s "  i n t o  decision-making.  Var iance  i s  one o f  
composite  measures o f  r i s k i n e s s ,  a s  it i s  d e f i n e d  based  on bo th  
u n c e r t a i n  outcomes measured i n  economic t e r m s  and  pe rce ived  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  them. Genera l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c h o i c e  
o f  r i s k  a t t r i b u t e s  and r u l e s  t o  a g g r e g a t e  them to  g i v e  a  r i s k  
measure,  however, a r e  r a t h e r  deep,  and beyond t h e  scope  o f  t h i s  
. - paper  (see Arrow , 1971; S c h a e f e r ,  1978) .  Our concerns  h e r e  
a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  
measures.  A few o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  c a s e s  where t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  
measures may be r e l e v a n t  and u s e f u l  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  below. 
F i r s t  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c a s e  where w e  a r e  concerned w i t h  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  r a r e  b u t  p o t e n t i a l l y  c o s t l y  e v e n t .  A p o t e n t i a l l y  
c o s t l y  e v e n t  means a  v a r i a n t  Z o f  f u t u r e  outcomes f o r  which j 
. . 
t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  C i j  o f  some a l t e r n a t i v e s  a i  a r e  ex t remely  
h igh .  Th i s  may be  t h e  c a s e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  a  s e r i o u s  w a t e r  
s h o r t a g e  i s  f o r e s e e n  under some development s c e n a r i o  w i t h o u t  
implementing a  l a r g e - s c a l e  development o f  new wa te r  sou rce s .  
Suppose t h e r e  a r e  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  a ,  and a 2 ,  which have 
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  f o r  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  v a r i a n t s  Z,, Z 2  and Z 3  o f  
e v e n t s  a s  g iven  by t h e  m a t r i x  i n  Tab le  1 .  Also g iven  a r e  prob- 
a b i l i t i e s  P I ,  P2 and P3 of  d i f f e r e n t  v a r i a n t s  o c c u r r i n g .  The 
v a r i a n t  Z r e p r e s e n t  a  r a r e  b u t  p o t e n t i a l l y  c o s t l y  e v e n t .  The 3 
expec t ed  v a l u e s  and v a r i a n c e s  o f  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  cost ( o r  r e g r e t )  
a r e  computed and g iven  f o r  each  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  
v a l u e s  o f  r o b u s t n e s s  R ( 6 )  computed from e q u a t i o n  ( 8 ) .  
Table 1 .  Regret Matrix f o r  a  Simple Example 
I f  t he  r a r e  event  Z 3  i s  ignored,  both a l  and a2  have v i r t u a l l y  
t h e  same expected r e g r e t  (which i s  approximately l o ) ,  and t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  a l  appears  b e t t e r  because i t s  c o s t s  have smaller 
var i ance .  2 ,  The a l t e r n a t i v e  a l  w i l l  be picked by t h e  r i s k -  
t h e o r e t i c  (mean-variance t r a d i n g - o f f )  and a 2  by t h e  game-theoretic 
( i . e .  minimax) approaches. I f  t h e  r a r e  e v e n t  Z 3  i s  inc luded  i n  
l ter-  
t a t i v e  
a l  
a 2  
t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  s e l e c t i o n  i s  n o t  easy based on both t h e  mean and ~ 
Expected 
r e g r e t  
1 0 . 4  
1 0 . 1  
Varain t  of  
f u t u r e  even t  '1 '2 '3 
P r o b a b i l i t y  .50 .49 . O 1  
Opportunity c o s t  OCi 
10 10  50 
15 5 5 
LCj  80 80 100 
t h e  var iance  o f  t h e  r e g r e t .  U s e  o f  robus tness  i n  such a  case  a s  
an a l t e r n a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  w e  a r e  n o t  much 
concerned about t h e  e x a c t  va lues  o f  oppor tun i ty  c o s t s  a s  long a s  
i 
they a r e  small  and bounded by some accep tab le  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o s t s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  which is  most e f f e c t i v e  under each event .  
The second p o s s i b l e  use o f  t h e  robus tness  c r i t e r i o n  is  sug- 
Variance 
o f  
r e g r e t  
15.84 
2 4 . 9 9  
g e s t e d  by what i s  c a l l e d  s a f e - f a i l  system, a s  compared with f a i l -  I 
s a f e  system (Rogers e t  a l .  1976) .  Some i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s  may have 






t h e  c o s t s  may be reduced by modifying and supplementing t h e  i n i -  
t i a l  a c t i o n s  a s  such an event  i s  observed. Some a l t e r n a t i v e s  
Robust- 




2 ) ~  small var iance  o f  t o t a l  c o s t s  by i t s e l f  does no t  imply a  
good des ign ,  s i n c e  it j u s t  measures d e v i a t i o n s  around t h e  mean. 
Robustness, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, i s  based on d e v i a t i o n s  from t h e  
l e a s t - c o s t  which s e r v e s  a s  a  r e fe rence .  
pe rmi t  such m o d i f i c a t i o n s  a t  l e s s  c o s t ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  do n o t .  
By u s ing  r o b u s t n e s s  a s  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n ,  w e  may choose 
such  an i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  t h a t  avo ids  ex t r eme ly  h igh  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t s  under any e v e n t ,  even though i t  may r e s u l t  i n  h i g h e r  ( b u t  
t o l e r a b l e )  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  under most e v e n t s .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  
i t  is  worthwhi le  t o  emphasize t h a t  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  which i s  never  
c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  under any e v e n t  Z (and t h u s  would neve r  be  chosen j  
by a  c o n v e n t i o n a l  method, even i f  w e  p a r a m e t e r i z e  on f u t u r e  con- 
d i t i o n s  a s  v a r i a n t s  Z ' s  o f  e v e n t s )  may s t i l l  be t h e  most r o b u s t .  j 
Another c a s e  where t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  may be  u s e f u l  
i s  when t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  - P o f  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  i s  h i g h l y  u n c e r t a i n .  
I n  such a  c a s e ,  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  expec t ed  c o s t s  based  on e s t i m a t e d  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  a l o n e  w i l l  n o t  be  very  meaningful .  Ra ther  it i s  
b e t t e r  t o  u s e  some s imp le  measure o f  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  economic 
performance.  
Also i n  some c a s e s ,  decis ion-makers  may want c o s t s  due t o  fo r e -  
c a s t  e r r o r s  t o  be  bounded. Th i s  may be an  impor t an t  cons ide ra -  
t i o n  f o r  w a t e r  p r o j e c t s ,  s i n c e  t h e y  u s u a l l y  have l o n g  l e a d  t i m e s ,  
and p l ann ing  c o n d i t i o n s  o f t e n  change d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d .  PJhen 
m u l t i p l e  p a r t i e s  a r e  i nvo lved  i n  deve lop ing  w a t e r  s o u r c e s ,  c o s t  I 
v a r i a b i l i t y  is  one o f  t h e  major  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
- 
of each  and t h u s  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a 
r o b u s t  p l a n  may p r o v i d e  a firmer b a s i s  f o r  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  o r  I 
any o t h e r  ar rangement  neces sa ry  t o  implement t h e  p r o j e c t .  
6 .  IMPLICATIONS TO DECISION-MAKING 
AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
A s  s t a t e d  b e f o r e ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  P a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  each  j 
e v e n t  Z canno t  i n  most c a s e s  be  e v a l u a t e d  o b j e c t i v e l y  l i k e  j 
e . g .  e x p e r t ' s  e s t i m a t e s .  I t  r e p r e s e n t s  n o t  o n l y  what is  l i k e l y  
t o  o c c u r  b u t  a l s o  which v a r i a n t  of  f u t u r e  outcomes d e c i s i o n -  
I 
makers perceive more likely than the others. It may even reflect 
which development path decision-makers prefer to others. Occur- 
rence of different events largely depends on national policies 
or other factors which are not controllable at a regional level 
of planning, but neither of them is completely uncontrollable. 
Therefore, when multiple parties are involved in the planning 
process, some kind of agreement on those alternative possibili- 
ties is a necessary prerequisite. 
This procedure of articulating probabilities for variants 
of future outcomes is not only necessary but also a desirable 
step. It is likely that not all of the concerned agree on a 
single development path; rather it is more realistic to specify 
alternative paths as represented by variants ( Z . 1  with associated 3 
probabilities {P . I .  3 
Another step necessary for the use of robustness criterion 
in alternative evaluation and selection is specification of level 
B or 6. Two possible ways are conceivable. One is to specify 
a value prior to generating information on economic performance 
of a set of alternatives, possibly at the same time as prior 
articulation of probabilities P 
1 .  The other is to determine a 
value in a more or less ad hoc way as we evaluate values of 
--
robustness of the alternatives for which information of perfor- 
mance under different events Z has already been generated. j 
Naturally the value of robustness ~ ( 6 )  or R is different B 
depending on the specified level 6 or B, and so is the ordering 
by the robustness criterion. In the latter case, therefore, 
iterative procedures may be necessary to agree on the level B 
or 6. The specified level of B or 6 reflects, to a certain 
extent, risk behaviours of decision-makers. If more emphasis 
i s  p l aced  on r a r e  b u t  p o t e n t i a l l y  ve ry  c o s t l y  e v e n t s ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  a  h i g h e r  v a l u e  w i l l  be  s e l e c t e d  f o r  6 ,  which r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  unde r  d i f f e r -  
e n t  e v e n t s  a r e  bounded by some v a l u e .  HOW meaningfu l  such  a  
l e v e l  is  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r i s k  b e h a v i o u r s  and which one  o f  two 
p o s s i b l e  ways ment ioned above w i l l  c a p t u r e  t h i s  a s p e c t  better ,  
a r e  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n s ,  b u t  beyond the  scope  o f  t h i s  paper .  
I t  is  j u s t  n o t e d  from an o p e r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  view t h a t ,  depend- 
i n g  on p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s  o r  c o n t e x t s  o f  decis ion-making,  e i t h e r  
6 o r  6 may be easier t o  s p e c i f y ,  hav ing  b e t t e r  a p p e a l  t o  d e c i s i o n -  
makers.  
Mention i s  made o f  l e v e l s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  u t i l i z a t i o n  t o  
c l a r i f y  some more i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  i n  
decis ion-making p r o c e s s e s .  Given a l t e r n a t i v e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n s  
a v a i l a b l e  {a i )  and v a r i a n t s  { z . )  o f  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  w i t h  a s s o c i a t e d  I 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  {P.), p r o c e d u r e s  o f  s c r e e n i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  may be  
I 
c l a s s i f i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  l e v e l s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  u t i l i z a t i o n .  A 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  i n  Tab l e  2 .  One ex t reme  i s  t o  p i c k  a  
s i n g l e  v a r i a n t  w i t h o u t  r e g a r d  t o  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and t o  e v a l u a t e  
economic performance of  a l t e r n a t i v e s  unde r  t h i s  e v e n t .  Another  
ext reme i s  t a b u l a t i o n ,  i . e .  a l l  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i t h  t h e i r  
performance a r e  on d i s p l a y  v i s - a - v i s  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  
e v e n t s .  Decision-making is  t h e  e a s i e s t  i n  t h e  fo rmer  case, and 
w i l l  probab ly  be  t h e  most  d i f f i c u l t  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e .  Com- 
promise  must be  sough t  between i n d e c i s i o n  due  t o  t o o  much un- 
o rga n i zed  i n f o r m a t i o n  and l o s s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  due t o  s c r e e n i n g  
and a g g r e g a t i o n .  A majo r  q u e s t i o n  i s  how t o  e x t r a c t  u s e f u l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  can  be used  t o  make mean ingfu l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
arnong a l t e r n a t i v e s .  U s e  o f  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  may p r o v i d e  
an  answer t o  t h i s .  I 
Table 2. A l t e r n a t i v e  Screening Procedures 
A l t e r n a t i v e  Spec i f i ed  Use of p r o b a b i l i t i e s  Remarks 
approaches even t s  P . i n  s p e c i f y i n g  3 i n  d e f i n i n g  
events?  obgec t ive?  
1. min K . +  C Z no s i n g l e  o u t  an j no 1 i j  
a 1  t e r n a t i v e  
Z yes: P . + max no II j 3 
2 .  2 yes  b u t  i m p l i c i t  no !I 
3 
3 .  Minimax {Z1, .. . , zk )  no no #I 
4 .  min K ~ + Z C ~ ~ P ~  la no yes  b u t  t o  
j i m p l i c i t  
5a.  A l t e r n a t i v e  
p r e d i c t i o n s  
method II 
b. Robustness- I 1  
cos t - e f f ec t ive -  
n e s s  t r ad ing -  
of f  
p a r t i a l  
s c reen ing  
Yes 
6 .  Tabula t ion  I, no no no sc reen ing  
7. SIMPLE EXAMPLE 
A simple example w i l l  i l l u s t r a t e  p o s s i b l e  use o f  t h e  robust-  
ness  c r i t e r i o n  a s  compared w i t h  o t h e r  methods. Table 3 provides  
a l l  t h e  information f o r  t h e  problem. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  
c o s t s  Ki f o r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  ai and t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  Ci j  of 
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  ai  under event  Z t h e  minimum c o s t s  L under j r  j 
each event  and t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  r a t i o  ROCij, c a l c u l a t e d  
according t o  t h e  formulae ( 3 )  and (5), r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a r e  a l s o  
given i n  t h e  matr ix .  Under t h e  mat r ix  a r e  shown t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  - P of f u t u r e  events .  The a l t e r n a t i v e s  a, through I 
a4 do no t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  while  t h e  
Table 3. Costs and Probabilities Data for the Example Problem 
Alternative initial actions 
alternatives a5 and a6 do. The alternative a, may be a large- 
scale development of new water sources (e.g. inter-basin trans- 
fer) and the alternatives a2, a3 and a4 may represent progres- 
- sively smaller-scale developments (e.g. of local water sources). 
The alternatives a5 and a6 involve taking non-structural measures 
in addition to probably minor or stagewise development of new 
water sources. 
Values of expected total costs ECi and values of robustness 
R~ (6) at level 6 = .75 are computed and given in Table 4, to- 
gether with ordering of the alternatives by each criterion. The 
expected total costs do not vary much among the alternatives, 
Table  4 .  Expected T o t a l  Cos t s  EC and Robustness ~ ( 6 )  
o f  A l t e r n a t i v e s  
ECi 38.75 35.15 35.15 35.35 34.90 35.35 
0 Q ordering @ @ Q @ 
-- - - 
R~ (.751 .599 . 6 7 1  .714 - 7 4 6  - 6 2 5  - 5 3 8  
ordering 6) 0 Q a) @ 6) 
remarks dominated dominated - >  dominated 
trade-offs 
and it may n o t  be  ea sy  t o  make a  d e c i s i o n  based on t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  
a l o n e ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  probably t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a l  w i l l  be excluded 
from f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  
c r i t e r i o n  r e v e a l s  t h r e e  o u t  of  s i x  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  dominated 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  by one o r  more a l t e r n a t i v e s .  3  
Those i n f e r i o r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  be ing  e l i m i n a t e d ,  t r a d e - o f f s  e x i s t  
among t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a  a  and a 5  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by F igure  2 .  3' 4 
Other  methods a r e  a l s o  a p p l i e d  t o  see how r e s u l t s  can be 
d i f f e r e n t .  ~ i r s t  no te  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  some ambigui ty  i n  
s p e c i f y i n g  a  s i n g l e  v a r i a n t  Z i n  t h e  approach 2 a  shown i n  Table j 
2 ,  s i n c e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  depending 
on a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I f  t h e  v a r i a n t  Z3 is  s e l e c t e d  based on t h e  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  cor responding  t o  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a l  through a 4 ,  t h e  
3 ,  This  dominance i s  a  weaker concept  than  f  i r s t - d e g r e e  s tochas -  
t i c  dominance (Whitmore and F ind ley ,  1978) . 
Robustness 
Figure 2. Total Cost-Robustness Trade-offs 
alternative a6 is found to be the least-cost among all (a2 among 
, 
structural alternatives) under this event. Both of them are 
.. inferior solutions, if the robustness is taken into account, 
and all the other alternatives are near optimal. If the variant 
Z 2  is selected instead, since it has the maximum probability 
when the alternative a5 is implemented, the alternative a4 be- 
comes the least-cost. A conventional criterion of minimizing 
expected total costs leads to selection of the alternative as; 
minimization of maximum regret or of maximum relative regret 
dictates adoption of the alternative aj or a respectively. 4 
How t o  make a f i n a l  s e l e c t i o n  based on t h e  in fo rma t ion  
p re sen ted  i n  Table  4 and F igure  2 i s  a remaining q u e s t i o n .  
Probably o t h e r  non-economical c r i t e r i a ,  e .g .  environmental  q u a l i t y  
should  a l s o  be in t roduced .  Based on t h e  economic c r i t e r i a  
a lone ,  however, t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a 3  which i s  never  c o s t -  
e f f e c t i v e  under any p a r t i c u l a r  e v e n t ,  may s t i l l  be t h e  f i n a l  
s e l e c t i o n .  
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Some a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  problem o f  p lanning  under u n c e r t a i n t y  
have been addressed  wi th  r e f e r e n c e  t o  water supply/demand systems 
planning.  General  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  involved  i n  t h e  problem are 
Z A X - Y Planning 
v a r i a n t  o f  exp lana to ry  f o r e c a s t e d  
f u t u r e  even t  v a r i a b l e s  w a t e r  demand 
Of course ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  p l a n  a f f e c t s  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  v a r i a n t s  
o f  f u t u r e  e v e n t s .  
A concept  of  robus tnes s  has  been in t roduced  t o  account  f o r  
vary ing  a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  a t  p r e s e n t  t o  
cope wi th  d i f f e r e n t  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  as r e p r e s e n t e d  by Z .  Robustness 
of  a water  supply/demand system w a s  d e f i n e d  a s  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  
perform under d i f f e r e n t  f u t u r e  e v e n t s  a t  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  
incrementa l  c o s t s .  A couple  o f  measures o f  robus tnes s  w e r e  
proposed,  based on oppor tun i ty  c o s t s  ( o r  r e g r e t )  under d i f f e r e n t  
e v e n t s  and p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  even t s .  These 
measures are r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  and easy  t o  compute. Moreover 
t hey  nay have b e t t e r  i n t u i t i v e  appea l  i n  many c a s e s  than ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  va r i ance .  
A new approach t o  t h e  problem o f  s c r e e n i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
invo lves  us ing  robus tnes s  as a c r i t e r i o n  t o  supplement a 
conven t iona l  o p t i m a l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  P o s s i b l e  
c a s e s  t o  which t h i s  approach may be  r e l e v a n t  and i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
t o  decis ion-making and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  were d i s c u s s e d .  
U s e  and v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  approach w e r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  by a  
s imp le  numer ica l  example and compar isons  w e r e  a l s o  made between 
t h i s  and o t h e r  more conven t iona l  approaches .  
P o s s i b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  a r e  n o t  
l i m i t e d  t o  water r e s o u r c e s  p l ann ing .  A c t u a l l y  t h e  .concept  o f  
r o b u s t n e s s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  paper  i s  q u i t e  g e n e r a l  and impor t an t  
t o  many problems which have t o  do w i t h  decis ion-making under  
u n c e r t a i n  f u t u r e  c o n d i t i o n s .  
I n  t h i s  pape r ,  o n l y  a  s u r f a c e  h a s  been s c r a t c h e d  of  a  poten-  
t i a l l y  impor t an t  and f r u i t f u l  a r e a  o f  s t u d y .  Many impor t an t  i s s u e s  
around t h e  s u b j e c t  a r e  l e f t  f o r  f u r t h e r  work. No d i s c u s s i o n  w a s  
g iven  on how t h e  c o s t s  o f  e a c h  a l t e r n a t i v e  under  d i f f e r e n t  e v e n t s  
can be computed, how t h e  d i f f e r e n t  e v e n t s  a r e  d e f i n e d  o r  how t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  them can be e v a l u a t e d .  How t h e  
decision-making problem u s i n g  r o b u s t n e s s  may be t r e a t e d  w i t h i n  
4 
formal a n a l y t i c a l  frameworks (e .g.  two-s tage  p r o c e s s  o r  Bayesian 
a n a l y s i s )  i s  a  remaining q u e s t i o n .  
Also t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  sys tems t o  s e r v e  changing 
needs o v e r  t i m e  may be measured by o t h e r  c r i t e r i a .  Sea rch  f o r  
t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  and e f f o r t s  t o  q u a n t i f y  them s o  t h a t  t h e y  can  be 
used i n  p l ann ing  p r o c e s s e s  shou ld  be con t inued .  
APPENDIX 
F l e x i b i l i t y  and Robustness  
One i n t u i t i v e  n o t i o n  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  d i c t a t e s  t h a t  a  p l a n  
which w i l l  pe rmi t  more o p t i o n s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  i s  a  more f l e x i b l e  
one.  Th i s  concep t  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  based s imply on a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  o p t i o n s  has  n o t  been an o p e r a t i o n a l  t o o l  f o r  decision-making 
p roces se s .  Some o p t i o n s ,  though a v a i l a b l e ,  may be ex t remely  
c o s t l y  t o  implement. 8 
S t i g l e r  ( 1 9 3 9 )  p r e s e n t e d  a  c o s t - r e l a t e d  concep t  o f  f l e x i -  
b i l i t y .  H e  d i s c u s s e d  a  c a s e  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t s  which a r e  
s u b j e c t  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  demand f o r  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s .  H e  c a l l e d  a  
p l a n t  f l e x i b l e ,  i f  it could  produce a  wide r ange  o f  o u t p u t  quan- 
t i t i e s  by i n c u r r i n g  r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  c o s t ,  even though 
it may n o t  have a  minimum average  c o s t  f o r  a  c e r t a i n  o u t p u t ,  e . g .  
t a r g e t  q u a n t i t y ,  q (See F i g u r e  A l ) .  Thi s  concep t  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  T 
i s  a l s o  r e l e v a n t  t o  d e s c r i b i n g  performance of  wa te r  r e s o u r c e s  
sys tems which a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  v a r i a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  b u t  y e t  n o t  
v e r y  o p e r a t i o n a l  by i t s e l f ,  
Average 
c o s t  
> 
6T: t a r g e t  Outpu t  q u a n t i t y  
F i g u r e  A.l S t i g l e r ' s  Concept  o f  F l e x i b i l i t y  
Marschak and Nelson ( 1 9 6 2 )  p r e s e n t e d  a coup l e  o f  measures  o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  ba sed  on pay-of f s  ( c o s t s  and/or  r evenue)  o f  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s ,  and showed t h a t  each  o f  them a c c o r d s  w i t h  t h e  
S t i g l e r ' s  concep t .  One measure i s  r e s t a t e d  i n  o u r  t e rms  a s  
f o l l o w s .  
An i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  a l  is more f l e x i b l e  t h a n  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  
a* ,  i f  
(i) g i v e n  any nurnber 8 > o ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  f u t u r e  a c t i o n  
\ 
a; such  t h a t  c (a ;  1 a 2 )  - ~ ( a ;  1 a 2 )  > 9 ,  
.r 
and i f  
(ii) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  number e*  - > o, such t h a t  f o r  a l l  f u t u r e  
a c t i o n s  a #  ~ ( a * l  a , )  - ~ ( a * /  a 2 )  2 e *  , 
where C ( a e l a )  i s  t h e  c o s t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  f u t u r e  a c t i o n  a* ,  
g i v e n  t h e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  a .  T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  based  on t h e  
unboundedness o f  c o s t  d i f f e r e n c e  a s  s e e n  i n  (i) above. Such an  
a c t i o n  a;, however, may neve r  be  t a k e n  unde r  any e v e n t ,  o r  t h e  
e v e n t  which c a l l s  f o r  t h e  a c t i o n  a; may occu r  o n l y  r a r e l y .  I n  
o t h e r  words, t h e r e  may be  t h e  case where t h e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  a l  
t u r n s  o u t  t o  have lower  c o s t s  by a  l a r g e  amount, b u t  t h e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  of  such a  case o c c u r r i n g  i s  ext remely  s m a l l .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  some p r o b a b i l i s t i c  concept  shou ld  be  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  opera- 
t i o n a l  measures. 
I f  t h e  boundedness o f  t h e  payoff  i s  assumed, on t h e  o t h e r  
hand, t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  based on t h e  c o s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
as g iven  above may be  modi f ied  as fo l lows .  If  t h e  maximum amount 
by which t h e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  al has  a h i g h e r  c o s t  t h a n  a2, is  
s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  maximum m o u n t  by which a2 has  a h i g h e r  c o s t  
t han  a l ,  t h e n  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  al  i s  more f l e x i b l e .  This  
f l e x i b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  is  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  minimax c r i t e r i o n  
a p p l i e d  t o  a t w o - a l t e r n a t i v e  case. Thi s  d e f i n i t i o n  may con t r a -  
d i c t  t h e  i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  a f l e x i b l e  d e s i g n  i s  t h e  one w i t h  p a y o f f s  
more i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  d i f f e r e n t  f u t u r e  c o n d i t i o n s  (i.e. a f l a t t e r  
c o s t  c u r v e ) .  I n  t h e  payoff  m a t r i x  i n  Table  Al, t h e  i n i t i a l  
a c t i o n  a l  has  a h i g h e r  c o s t  t h a n  a2 by t h e  amount 10 a t  most, 
and t h e  i n i t i a l  a c t i o n  a 2  h a s  a h i g h e r  c o s t  t h a n  a l  by 15 a t  
most. Thus t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  al is more f l e x i b l e  acco rd ing  t o  t h e  
above c r i t e r i o n ,  wh i l e  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a2 has ,  i n  a s e n s e ,  a 
f l a t t e r  c o s t  curve.  
I n s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  payof f ,  however, may n o t  be  a d e s i r a b l e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  by i t se l f .  Consider  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  al and a2 
having t o t a l  c o s t  cu rves  as p o r t r a y e d  i n  F igu re  A2. The c o s t s  
a r e  g iven  as f u n c t i o n s  of some parameter ,  q ,  whose e x a c t  v a l u e  
i n  f u t u r e  is  unknown. The a l t e r n a t i v e  al is  called more f l e x i b l e  
t h a n  a2 accord ing  t o  t h e  Marschakand Nelson ' s  measure. I t  may 
a l s o  be c o n j e c t u r e d  t h a t  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  involved  i n  
Table  A1 : Payoff  (Cost)  I!atrix 
F u t u r e  a c t i o n s  
a; a '  2 a; 
T o t a l  A 
A l t e r n a t i v e  
a l  i n i t i a l  
a c t i o n s  a2 
c o s t  
10 20 0  
5  10 15 
1 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  
'2 
system parameter  
F i g u r e  A.2 T o t a l  Cos t  Curves f o r  A l t e r n a t i v e  Designs 
f u t u r e  e v e n t s ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  advantage o f  t h e  more f l e x i b l e  
a l t e r n a t i v e .  However, which a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  found more d e s i r a b l e ,  
g iven  a  l e v e l  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  ( o r  conve r se ly ,  g iven  an i n fo rma t ion  
l e v e l )  is  a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n .  I f  some a n a l y s i s  e n a b l e s  t o  s p e c i f y  
t h e  paramete r  w i t h  some d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu re  A2, 
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  a l  appea r s  l e s s  d e s i r a b l e .  
Given a  s p e c i f i e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  paramete rs  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  
p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a n o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  a  measure o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  is  def ined .  I n t u i t i v e l y  an a l t e r n a t i v e  which has  a 
h igher  p r o b a b i l i t y  of being less c o s t l y  may be c a l l e d  more 
f l e x i b l e .  This d e f i n i t i o n ,  however, i s  an equ iva len t  o f  t h e  
"wider-range-of-options" measure of  f l e x i b i l i t y  a s  presented  
above, and thus  has  t h e  same de f i c i ency .  Amounts by which one 
a l t e r n a t i v e  is  l e s s  c o s t l y  than  another  a r e  n o t  taken i n t o  
account. 
Our measures of  robus tness  a s  presented  i n  t h i s  paper a r e  
based on both cos t -d i f f e rences  and a s p e c i f i e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
a s s o c i a t e d  with v a r i a b l e  f u t u r e  events .  The c o s t - d i f f e r e n c e s  
a r e  computed by using minimum t o t a l  c o s t s  a s  r e f e r e n c e s  s o  t h a t  
t h e  concept of  " r e g r e t "  i s  duly represented .  Rather than  com- 
put ing  t h e  expected r e g r e t  based on t h e  s p e c i f i e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  
t h e  measures of  robus tness  a r e  def ined  t o  account f o r  v a r i a b i l i t y  
i n  t o t a l  c o s t s .  
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